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Abstract  
 
This paper outlines the complex historical legacy and structural adjustment efforts in 
Mozambique in addition to reviewing recent economic developments. An in-depth analysis of 
new and more reliable national accounts data show that macroeconomic stabilisation has 
occurred through recovery from a suppressed outset. Yet, easy import substitution has now 
been used up, and structural transformation on the export side remains to be addressed. 
Moreover, a coherent development strategy geared towards poverty reduction is still to be 
implemented. The government budget also remains problematic, and aid dependency 
continues. Accordingly, fundamental development challenges lie ahead. 
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STABILIZATION AND STRUCTURAL 
 ADJUSTMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE: 
AN APPRAISAL 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economic and social policy in Mozambique has undergone a sequence of truly remarkable 
changes during the past 25 years. Emerging out of colonialism in 1974, the newly independent 
country initially opted for a command-type economic system inspired by Marxism. It was soon 
recognised that this approach would not be successful. However, attempts at economic reform 
could not withstand the vicious war and destruction fuelled by a racist South Africa. Economic 
collapse became inevitable in 1986, and a set of market-oriented policies was formulated under 
the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank. Only limited progress was realised before peace 
was agreed on in 1992. Peace was accompanied in October of 1994 by free and democratic 
elections, in which the leader of the former Frelimo liberation movement, Joaquim Chissano, 
was elected President.  Frelimo also retained government control, while the former rebel 
movement, Renamo, became the main opposition party. A new political scene was set, and 
attempts at reinvigorating economic reforms within the framework of the liberalistic inspired 
Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme (ESRP) were initiated.  
 
The transition to democracy in Mozambique was precipitated by fundamental changes in the 
international political environment. The collapse of the Eastern European and South-African 
political systems removed many of the external economic and political forces that kept 
looming behind the devastating internal strife of Mozambique during the 1980s. Nonetheless, 
the development challenges in the early 1990s and the structural deformation of the economy 
remained overwhelming, rooted as they are in (i) Portuguese colonial domination from the late 
19th century,  (ii) a decade long military struggle leading up to independence in 1975, (iii) 
inept economic policies pursued by Frelimo in the immediate post-independence years, and 
(iv) the vicious guerilla war staged by Renamo with South African backing from 1980 until 
cease fire in 1992. Mozambique has now been trying to come to grips with these challenges for 
more than a decade. Thus, it is most pertinent to try to distill the policy lessons learned from 
the post-1992 period where peace and relative political stability have been characteristic. Have 
the reforms implemented so far led to desired results in terms of stabilising and adjusting one 
of the poorest countries in the world, and has a sound foundation for future growth and 
stability been established? Answering questions such as these is by no means easy due to a 
whole gamut of reasons. Nevertheless, peace and the availability of new data have certainly 
made the task more manageable and meaningful than in the past.  
 
The analysis of the Mozambican reform process in this article will draw on a new set of 
national accounts, put together by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS). The NIS data set 
covers the period 1991-96, and preliminary aggregate figures are available for 1997. The new 
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data have been compiled in accordance with the UN standards for national accounting, and 
they are widely believed to be of higher quality than the official set of national accounts, 
published by the National Directorate of Planning (NDP). Since the implications of the two 
sets of national accounts diverge, the current analysis will provide new insights into the 
adjustment process in Mozambique. Given the importance of the historical heritage in 
understanding present challenges, Section 2 provides an outline of the path to economic 
collapse as well as basic political, economic and social background. This is followed in Section 
3 by a detailed review of the reform efforts from 1987 onwards, whereas the macroeconomic 
trends, which emerge from available data sources, are studied in Section 4. Section 5 contains 
an overall analysis of the stabilization and structural adjustment experience and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Historical setting 
 
The early colonial economic system in Mozambique was, besides trade in gold with 
present-day Zimbabwe, based on the so-called prazo system under which Portuguese settlers 
were granted land as well as absolute power and authority over local people. Many prazos 
were abandoned before 1700 as indigenous resistance towards the Portuguese pushed the 
colonialists out of rural areas. Yet, the rise in slave trade followed soon after, and a variety of 
policies to ensure an ample supply of cheap labour were put in place once slavery was 
officially abolished around 1850. Forced labour and taxes, which could only be settled in cash, 
were institutionalised, and this left rural populations with little alternative, but to try to increase 
their production of marketed crops such as cashew and cotton or work as wage labour on 
plantations or in major investment programmes in Mozambique or the mines in South Africa. 
 
Portuguese colonisation intensified at the end of the 19th century, but Portugal did not have 
sufficient capital and power to enforce the occupation. This became possible instead through 
the investment of foreign capital by a variety of British, Rhodesian and South African 
companies. These companies were given extensive concessions and administrative rights. 
Thus, by 1917 - when the occupation was complete - Mozambique was to a large extent run by 
foreign capital. In parallel with the more dominating role of foreign capital, the physical 
infrastructure became highly skewed towards the needs of neighbouring countries. Due to 
Mozambique’s unique geographical location, roads and railways were geared towards the 
provision of transit services, from which large rents were generated. Little attention was given 
to intra-country logistical needs. The result was a significant lack of interconnections between 
the regions of Mozambique at the end of the colonial period. Basic communications were at 
the time either lacking or - as in the case of the main rail lines - running east-west, from ports 
on the coastline to South Africa, Rhodesia and Malawi. 
 
Even by the standards of colonial administration in Africa, there was little investment in social 
infrastructure in Mozambique, and even jobs requiring only minimal skills were restricted for 
European settlers. In other words, the economy catered to the needs of the Portuguese, who 
assumed responsibility for a broad range of functions. Local human capital accumulation was 
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extremely limited with the result that black Mozambican literacy remained under 10 percent 
(Green, 1991). Though secondary and technical education grew after 1960, and a new 
university with room for 1,500 students was established, these institutions almost exclusively 
served the settler community. Accordingly, at the time of independence the number of 
Mozambicans with university training amounted to only approximately 40 (FAO, 1982). 
 
The last 15 years of colonial rule were characterised by (i) the struggle for independence from 
1962, (ii) a gradual removal of racially discriminating legislation such as the labour laws, (iii) 
a continued inflow of Portuguese settlers, and (iv) an increase in foreign investments. In 
particular, Portugal was for the first time making available substantial financial resources. This 
benefited especially industries such as food processing, textiles and machinery and equipment, 
oriented towards the domestic settler community. In parallel with this colonial investment 
strategy, the focus in the composition of imports shifted from consumption to capital goods. 
Thus, this period was characterised by capital accumulation and growth. Nevertheless, the 
basic contours of the colonial economic system remained in place. The dependence on imports 
for investment and consumption purposes continued unabated, and agricultural exports, 
migrant worker remittances, and transit and tourist services were critical for foreign exchange 
earnings. Moreover, the Portuguese colonial rule left a legacy of widespread administrative 
controls, combined with the phenomenal reliance on Portuguese human capital. 
 
During the 1974-75 transition and the first year of independence, some 90 percent of the 
Portuguese settlers or an estimated 200,000 people left Mozambique. This left the country with 
a deserted and damaged capital stock and a nation with a seriously depleted human capacity in 
terms of skilled and semi-skilled workers as well as experienced professionals and 
administrators. It is illustrative that the agricultural marketing network literally collapsed 
within a matter of months after the Portuguese exodus. The rural population suddenly found 
themselves without access to even rudimentary networks for the distribution of goods and 
marketing of output. At the same time, external service and tourist receipts began dropping 
dramatically, and South Africa took steps to cut back the number of migrant labourers, and 
divert transit cargo elsewhere. Further potential revenue from transit services was lost due to 
the application of the United Nations Resolution on Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and 
Support to the Patriotic Front. 
 
Government intervention in agricultural pricing and marketing was well established before 
Mozambique obtained independence. The colonial Portuguese government set producer and 
consumer prices as well as marketing margins for an exhaustive list of agricultural products. In 
the 1960s, a marketing board for cereals was created. The focus on centralized decision 
making, which underpinned the agricultural pricing and marketing system of pre-independence 
Mozambique, was clearly in line with the ideological preferences of the new government. The 
continuing centralized marketing system was, subsequently, put under control of the state 
marketing enterprise, Agricom. Following independence, the rationale of the new government 
for state intervention was, nevertheless, different, as policy actions were in general conceived 
within the framework of a centrally planned economy. Hence, all land, banks, schools and 
medical services were nationalized, and administrators were appointed by the state to run the 
more than 2,000 abandoned commercial farms and industrial companies. 
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The desire for strong centralization of decision making was reaffirmed by the Third Congress 
of Frelimo in 1977. On the same occasion, focus was put squarely on the role of the state in 
savings, investment, production and trade. The annual central state plan, which contained 
detailed investment and output targets, acquired the status of law. Meeting targets, set by the 
central planning authorities, became obligatory with little reference to costs and profits, and 
state control started permeating almost all commercial activities in the economy. Private 
companies remained in existence, but as small scale entities, and they were subjected to strict 
regulation. Great hopes were attached to the new centralised political system, and the Ten Year 
Perspective Plan launched in December of 1981 envisaged GDP growth rates of no less than 
17 percent per year over a ten year period (Government of Mozambique, 1981). Yet, 
Mozambique lacked the necessary human and capital resources to achieve growth rates of such 
magnitudes, and since investments did not yield expected economic returns, a critical foreign 
debt burden started accumulating. Moreover, the failure on the part of the government to 
provide adequate support on a continuous basis for peasant development gradually affected 
confidence of the population in Frelimo. 
 
The negative economic trends and the lack of support to the rural smallholder sector, was 
recognized already in 1983 by the Fourth Congress of the Frelimo party. The one-eyed focus 
on state farms, excessive centralization of decision making and the management system’s 
rigidity and inability to adjust quickly to changing needs were identified as main problems to 
be resolved. It was also recognised that planning as so far practised, based on a set of material 
balances, had left the economic system extremely vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Conse-
quently, Frelimo committed itself to initiate a set of reforms, including greater economic 
flexibility and decentralisation and reliance on market forces. Renewed emphasis was put on 
the importance of the peasant sector, private initiative was to be promoted in all sectors of the 
economy, and reforms were instituted in labour legislation and in the regulation of foreign 
investment. It was highlighted that Agricom, which purchased around 40 percent of the total 
amount of crops marketed, should act as a buyer of last resort and not as a monopsonist in the 
procurement of crops from peasant farmers. Moreover, nominal consumer and agricultural 
producer prices were raised significantly, and producer incentives came more into focus as an 
issue and overall objective.  
 
However, due to the escalation of hostilities in rural areas, the measures adopted to 
decentralize decision-making and strengthen the reliance on market forces were not effective. 
In the late 1970s Mozambique had become a vocal member of the group of frontline states, in 
opposition to the Rhodesian and South African governments. Consequently, Renamo was 
created with the support of the white regime in Rhodesia, and after Zimbabwe gained 
independence in 1980, it was maintained with support from South Africa. A political move by 
the Frelimo leader Samora Moises Machel to stop the war by signing the Nkomati Accord in 
1984, was to no avail. The unrest disrupted road communications throughout the country. In 
addition, the agricultural marketing system, which had started to regain momentum after the 
initial exodus of the Portuguese, was seriously affected. On top of the disruptive internal strife, 
a series of natural disasters, including in particular the droughts of 1982-83 and 1983-84, 
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occurred with devastating consequences for the economy. The final result was a complete 
economic collapse in 1986. 
 
All sectors of the economy were affected. The industrial sector had been unable to cope with 
the large investment projects initiated under the auspices of the Ten Year Perspective Plan due 
to issues such as centralized control of prices and distribution, lack of foreign exchange, 
shortage of inputs, and irregular power supplies. The world recession in the early 1980s 
impacted as well. Thus, industry operated at only 20-30 percent of capacity, and by 1986 
industrial output had been reduced to less than half its 1981 level. A similar downward trend 
could be observed for the agricultural sector, where the disruptive effects of war and the series 
of natural disasters were the major causes behind the fall of more than 50 percent in officially 
marketed production. In sum, GDP fell at 6 percent per year in real terms from 1981-86, and 
the accumulated per capita drop amounted to about 45 percent (Tarp, 1990 and World Bank, 
1996).  Internal and external economic balances were close to impossible to manage, while 
repressed inflation mounted due to a loss of monetary control. Generalized shortages were 
endemic, parallel markets grew rapidly, the exchange rate became grossly overvalued and 
dependence on donors for financial assistance and food aid reached excessive proportions. 
Hence, it was clear that drastic economic reform measures were required, but even more 
pressing was the need for peace, as repeatedly stressed by Samora Machel, until his death in a 
plane crash in South Africa in 1986. 
 
The severity of the Mozambican civil war is clear from UN estimates. More than one million 
people died during the 1980s, while close to five million were displaced from rural areas, out 
of a total population of less than 15 million (UNICEF, 1989). Furthermore, a large part of the 
social and economic infrastructure was destroyed, including some 1,000 clinics and health 
posts as well as 3,000 schools.  No less than 400 teachers were killed. In addition, livestock 
populations were literally decimated, and the Livestock Directorate of the Ministry of 
Agriculture estimates that it will take decades before cattle herds re-attain levels existing in 
1983 (Songane, 1996).  
 
Despite ongoing civil war, a liberal constitution was adopted following discussions at the Fifth 
Congress of Frelimo in 1990. With this step, Mozambique moved decisively towards political 
pluralism and democracy. The constitution of 1990 provides for separation of the executive, 
legislative and judiciary powers and manadates regular elections. Following the signing of the 
peace accord, the UN installed its third largest peace keeping operation ever. General elections 
were held in October 1994, and Mozambique is currently nurturing a multi-party democracy, 
in which basic human rights are protected by law. 
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3. Economic reform efforts 
 
To counteract the economic collapse, the Government of Mozambique introduced in 1987 a 
comprehensive Economic Rehabilitation Programme (ERP). Subsequently, the reform effort 
was renamed Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme (ESRP) in 1989 to put focus on 
the social dimension of the effort.
1
 The stated intention of the programme was to lay the 
foundation for economic growth through a shift to a more market based economy. The ESRP, 
as originally conceived, was fairly standard in design. The diagnosis was of an economy which 
failed to maintain monetary control, consumed beyond its means, focussed production 
excessively on non-traded goods, and relied on inefficient and inflexible microeconomic 
structures. The ESRP included a series of standard stabilisation measures such as fiscal 
adjustment, monetary restraint, and devaluation of the exchange rate. In order to enhance 
microeconomic efficiency and the capacity of the economy to withstand external shocks, 
substantial price and trade liberalisation was pursued. Similarly, institutional reforms of the 
financial sector and a privatisation programme for state enterprises were included as key 
components of the programme. 
 
Considerable efforts at price liberalisation occurred in the three years following the initiation 
of the reforms. While products with fixed prices accounted for about 70 percent of GDP in 
1986, this proportion had, by 1989, fallen to about 30 percent. Four years later, in July 1993, 
the government took the substantial step of liberalising prices for major food products such as 
maize meal, cooking oil, and rice. Price liberalisation continued such that administered 
consumer prices were, in early 1996, limited to wheat flour, bread, rents, fuels, utilities, and 
certain transportation fares. By the end of 1996, these few remaining controls had either been 
removed or a system of regular updating had been put into place usually with reference to 
world prices (World Bank and Republic of Mozambique, 1996). 
 
However, minimum producer prices for nine agricultural products, including white maize, 
beans, groundnuts, sunflower, raw cashew nut, cotton, mafurra, paddy, and tobacco persisted 
into 1996 (World Bank, 1996). Particular concern was attached to the impacts of minimum 
prices on maize markets, even though the minimum prices were not generally enforced. Thus, 
there were reports of selective sanctions against traders purchasing at prices below minimum 
price levels (Moll, 1996). Since risk of sanction mitigates against the development of private 
trading activities, the World Bank and other donors continued to push for abolition of de jure 
minimum prices. Consequently, the government transformed food crop minimum prices to 
indicative prices in 1997. In sum, domestic price liberalisation has been carried very close to 
meeting the intentions in the ESRP. 
 
Trade liberalisation, including a move from a system of managed trade towards a liberal trade 
regime with imports subject to ad-valorem tariffs, has been more gradual. Since 1987, 
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports have been scrapped, the number and average 
                                                 
1
 To keep the number of acronyms to a minimum, adjustment programmes ongoing since 1987 will be 
referred to as the ESRP. 
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level of tariff rates substantially reduced, and licensing procedures simplified or rendered 
automatic. Accordingly, the import tariff structure, implemented in November 1996, contained 
only three rates: 2.5, 7.5, and 35 percent (Ministry of Planning and Finance, 1996). Despite the 
simplified tariff rate structure, it still implies significant effective protection for some 
agricultural processing industries. For example, the rate applied to wheat is 2.5 percent while 
the rate applied to wheat flour is 35 percent. This implies that the effective protection afforded 
to wheat milling activities is quite high. Also an export restrictions (taxes and quotas) have 
been in place for raw cashew nuts in order to protect the domestic cashew processing industry. 
 
The area of trade policy, which caused the gravest concerns was, however, customs 
administration. In 1995, the Maputo port authority reported that between 300 and 400 import 
containers had been sitting at the port for more than 180 days, and the average dwell time in 
port was 114 days (Castro, 1995). Available evidence, moreover, suggests that illicit means 
existed for traders to speed up the importing process, not to mention avoiding import duties. 
The unsustainable situation in Maputo port, has given momentum to the ongoing efforts to 
reform the customs administration. Thus, administrative responsibilities have now formally 
been contracted to a private UK-firm, Crown Agents, which began operations in mid-1997. 
 
As one of the key components of the ESRP, a comprehensive privatisation programme was 
initiated in 1989, and by September 1994, about 370 small and medium size enterprises had 
been privatised (USAID, undated). Nevertheless, very slow progress in privatising large firms 
meant that around two thirds of total industrial output was still accounted for by state owned 
firms.
2
 Starting in 1994, the privatisation of large enterprises accelerated. By 1996, 32 large 
enterprises amouting to a large part of the existing stock had been privatised, while another 27 
large enterprises were scheduled to be sold in 1997. Moreover, the performance of firms, once 
privatised, has been positive. A joint World Bank/Government of Mozambique study found 
that, on average, large enterprises increased output by a multiple of nearly four in the three 
year period following privatisation (World Bank and Republic of Mozambique, 1997). 
Regarding the Mozambican railways (CFM), earlier assistance programmes have ensured that 
rehabilitation of the three port railway systems, all ravaged by war, has been completed. 
Nevertheless, a decision has been made to delay privatisation in favour of a restructuring and 
revitalisation programme.  
 
Another key component of the ESRP was the privatisation of the commercial financial sector. 
In 1989, the banking system effectively consisted of two state owned banks, Banco de 
Moçambique (BM) and Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD). Efforts to gain control 
over money creation meant that the commercial banking functions of BM were separated out 
in 1992, by the creation of Banco Commercial de Moçambique (BCM). Privatisation of BCM 
was contemplated shortly after, but audits of BCM accounts for 1992-93 revealed “substantial 
losses”, mainly due to soft loans to parastatals. Continued poor performance of both BCM and 
BPD impaired the ability of BM to maintain monetary control, and faced with the 
                                                 
2
 A state owned firm is defined as a company with majority state ownership either through direct state 
ownership or indirectly through majority ownership by other state owned enterprises. 
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consequences of slow and partial banking reform, the government made a decision in March 
1995 to proceed as quickly as possible with the privatisation of both financial institutions 
(World Bank, 1995). Subsequently, BCM was privatised in the summer of 1996, while 
privatisation of BPD occurred in late 1997. 
 
The agricultural marketing system is now to a large extent in private hands, and major markets 
for agricultural output, particularly in the central region, appear to be active. Thus, circuits for 
treating marketed agricultural production have been developing, while state involvement in 
purchase, storage, and transport of marketed surplus has been declining, particularly in the 
southern and central parts of the country. In 1994, the state marketing enterprise, Agricom 
entrusted with a broad mandate for purchasing, storing, and transporting a wide array of 
agricultural products, was restructured and renamed Instituto de Cereais de Moçambique 
(ICM). The reconstructed institution was, subsequently, given a mandate to act as a buyer of 
last resort, manage strategic stocks to ensure food security, and contribute to the stabilisation 
of producer and consumer prices. Despite, the official status, ICM has effectively operated like 
a private organisation, since no budgetary allocations, working capital, or donor support has 
been received (Coulter, 1996). Moreover, ICM is still an important player in the procurement 
of agricultural output, with a storage capacity of approximately 235,000 tons. Reports indicate, 
among other things, that ICM has been successful in procuring some maize for export out of 
the northern provinces (Miller, 1996). No future strategies regarding ICM have so far been 
outlined by the government. 
 
Since the cessation of hostilities in 1992, the use of agricultural production inputs has 
remained rudimentary. It is difficult to determine whether the negligible use of purchased 
inputs is due to lack of effective demand or limited supply. An examination of Semoc, the 
major seed company of Mozambique, provides some insight into the current state of input 
markets. As a former state enterprise, Semoc was privatised as part of the privatisation 
programme. Since 1994, the company had made substantial efforts to develop a retail network, 
but the retracting of donor support for resettlement of displaced people, meant that weak sales 
failed to cover costs. The company survived by downsizing, generating revenue through 
trading activities, and converting land previously allocated to seed production activities to 
straight agricultural production. Semoc projects the market for seed to grow slowly, and it 
envisages that it will need to rely on other income sources for several years before it can focus 
exclusively on its core business of producing seed (Bay, 1996).  
 
Inadequate transport infrastructure has been one of the major constraints to the development of 
trade, particularly in the agriculture sector. While substantial infrastructure investments have 
resulted in a distinctly improved primary and secondary road system, serious problems remain 
in transporting agricultural surplus from the farm gate to the roads. This difficulty is 
compounded by a war-induced shortage of animal traction. After approximately one billion 
USD in investment, the fertile northern parts of the country remain poorly integrated with the 
rest of the country, while distinct improvements have been made in the southern regions. The 
extent of the road network improvements in the south can be measured in part by a detailed 
study of maize market integration between Maputo and Chimoio (a major market on the Beira 
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corridor). It suggests that significant price linkages exist between these two markets (Donovan, 
1996). 
 
The marketing system for cashew has been the focus of intense policy debate in recent years. 
After having raised a ban on exports in 1991, the government has, since 1993, set and abided 
by a schedule for eliminating the export tax on raw cashew by the year 2000. Previous lack of 
competition in export markets and extraordinary inefficiency in domestic cashew processing 
permitted the domestic price for the raw cashew nut to fall to 16 percent of the export price or 
about one third the level received by farmers in neighbouring Tanzania (Castro, 1995). 
Recently, privatised cashew processors seem to have realised efficiency gains. Accordingly, 
increased competition between processors and exporters, has allowed producer prices to 
increase to 40 percent of the export price in 1996. 
 
Macro-economic reform efforts in Mozambique have over the past decade been at the core of 
the ESRP programme. Nevertheless, despite stated intentions from the outset, fiscal adjustment 
has only recently begun on any significant scale. Effects of the ESRP are visible on the 
expenditure side.  Initiatives to raise government revenue collection include the recent 
privatisation of the customs administration and the planned introduction of a value added tax 
(VAT). Overall, the key recommendation of the World Bank’s first public expenditure review 
in 1989, to increase government revenues, has not so far been achieved. The persistent inflows 
of substantial amounts of aid have therefore been essential in financing public expenditure. 
Efforts towards retrenchment of the government work force have not been successful, but the 
so-called peace dividend did materialise. In combination with strict limits on wages and 
salaries of civil servants, spending on public administration and defence has been reduced 
significantly. 
 
On the monetary side, the ESRP was very specific in recommending monetary restraint. 
However, the entanglement of the central and commercial banking functions of the Banco de 
Moçambique (BM), was a stumbling block. Thus, while BM performed central bank functions, 
it also held more than two thirds of all commercial loans, with the majority of its portfolio 
directed towards parastatals. While direct subsidies to these companies, amounting to 12 
percent of GDP in 1987, had been substantially reduced by 1992, indirect subsidies via soft 
loans from BM proved difficult to control. A survey of industrial companies in 1993 found that 
most state owned companies had non-performing loans with the banking system (Castro, 
1995). Privatisation of BCM coincided with the regaining of monetary control in 1996. The 
inflation rate dropped to one-digit levels, after having hovered around 50 percent during most 
of the previous period. Although adjustment to the new low-inflationary environment has been 
slow, nominal interest rates have recently started to provide market-oriented signals. 
Accordingly, real interest rates have turned positive after remaining negative up until 1995. 
 
Overvaluation of the exchange rate in 1987 was of major concern, and devaluation of the 
exchange rate was one of the essential building blocks in the structural adjustment programme. 
Between 1987 and 1995, the exchange rate continuously lost value relative to major currencies 
in nominal terms. Parallel markets existed throughout this period; however, parallel and 
official rates have converged. In 1987, parallel markets traded the Metical at fifty times the 
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official rate. By 1995, this differential had narrowed to approximately 10%. With the 
establishment of monetary control in 1996, the exchange rate came into line with the rate on 
parallel markets. Subsequently, these parallel markets have all but vanished. 
 
Reform efforts have also been directed towards the social sector, in particular the health and 
education networks. Educational rehabilitation has in particular concerned primary education, 
where almost all of the school network has been rebuilt. Rehabilitation of health care has also 
seen some progress, in relation to the recent initiation of a six-year health programme. In line 
with the general liberalisation efforts, private education was reintroduced in 1990, while 
private health care has been allowed since 1992. A variety of safety net initiatives has also 
been pursued, but the need for increasing attention to social issues is widely recognised. 
 
4. Economic and social developments 
 
Given the momentous economic and political changes over the past decade, the scope for 
recuperation and improvement in economic performance has, particularly since 1992, been 
enormous. However, assessing such change is critically dependent on the availability of 
reliable data. The National Institute of Statistics (NIS) has produced coherent sets of national 
accounts in accordance with the UN System of National Accounts (NIS, 1997).
3
 The NIS 
figures differ from the current official national accounts published by the National Directorate 
of Planning (NDP). These differences reflect that the NDP data are based on problematic 
estimation and cross-checking procedures (Johnson, 1995). More specifically, the NDP 
national accounts rely heavily on data from technical ministries and public enterprises, and 
they do not capture a variety of activities in the services sector. In contrast, the NIS data are 
based on a variety of surveys,
4
 and adjustment is made for items which go unnoticed in the 
NDP approach. Accordingly, the more reliable NIS data will be the main data source in what 
follows. Yet, since balance of payments data are compiled in accordance with NDP national 
accounts only, both sets of data must be relied on in putting together a coherent assessment. 
 
The evolution of real GDP according to NIS as well as the official NDP figures is set out in 
Table 1 below. Concentrating on the NIS data, it appears that overall growth of real GDP has 
been respectable in the period 1991-96. A dramatic drought-induced fall in real GDP in 1992, 
was reversed the following year, marking the beginning of a period with continuous growth. 
More specifically, the reasonably high real GDP growth rate in 1994 was supported by the 
presence of significant external funding of elections, disarmament and mine removal, 
amounting to nearly 5 percent of GDP. Despite the disappearance of these special 
programmes, real per capita growth remained positive in 1995 and even accelerated slightly in 
                                                 
3
 Formally speaking the NIS was only established in 1998, taking over the duties of the former National 
Directorate of Statistics (NDS). In what follows, the acronym NIS will be used. 
4
 These include demographic, expenditure and production surveys. 
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1996. Preliminary GDP figures for 1997 indicate very rapid overall growth of more than 12 
percent on an annual basis. 
 
Looking at the differences in growth rates between the NIS and NDP estimates, they paint as 
expected different pictures of the evolution of GDP. Thus, NIS data imply a significant drop 
and consequent rebound in 1992-93, and reasonably high and stable growth rates during 
1994-96. The official NDP figures imply, on the other hand, that the drought did not affect real 
GDP significantly, while an unprecedented 19 percent growth rate followed in 1993. After this 
jump, the NDP recorded more modest growth rates in 1994-95, while the 1996 estimated 
performance matches that of NIS. In sum, there are some similarities among the two sets of 
data, including low growth in the drought stricken year of 1992, followed by high growth rate 
in 1993, a levelling off through 1995 and a resumption of high growth in 1996. Nevertheless, 
the NIS data tell a story of an economy, which has maintained stability and continuity in the 
adjustment process, while the NDP figures indicate more erratic movements. The former are 
judged to be a more adequate picture of the post-1992 period. 
 
 
Table 1. Real GDP (100 bn. Mt. in 1991 prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
Real GDP (NIS) 
 
29.0 
 
26.6 
 
28.9 
 
31.1 
 
32.5 
 
34.8 
 
Growth rate 
(NIS) 
 
 
 
-8.1 
 
8.4 
 
7.8 
 
4.3 
 
7.1 
 
Growth rate 
(NDP) 
 
 
 
-0.8 
 
19.3 
 
4.4 
 
1.4 
 
6.4 
 
Source: Anuário Estatístico, Statistical Bulletin, and National Institute of 
Statistics (1997). 
 
Movements in the component shares of real value added are presented in Table 2. These 
figures indicate that the share of the agricultural sector has increased from 1994. The sector 
contributed with almost a third of real GDP at factor prices in 1996. Increasing real GDP 
shares have also been recorded in the investment related construction sector and the export 
oriented transport and communication sector. The relative importance of the commerce, 
service and manufacturing sectors (excluding food processing) have declined. 
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Table 2. Sectoral shares of real value added (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
Agriculture 
 
30.7 
 
26.8 
 
30.4 
 
28.1 
 
31.5 
 
32.6 
 
Fisheries 
 
3.5 
 
3.3 
 
3.3 
 
2.9 
 
2.8 
 
2.8 
 
Agricultural Processing 
 
6.5 
 
6.6 
 
5.6 
 
5.5 
 
5.7 
 
7.1 
 
Mining 
 
0.4 
 
0.3 
 
0.3 
 
0.3 
 
0.4 
 
0.3 
 
Manufactures 
 
2.8 
 
2.7 
 
2.5 
 
1.6 
 
1.7 
 
0.8 
 
Construction 
 
6.5 
 
7.1 
 
6.7 
 
8.1 
 
9.0 
 
9.6 
 
Transport and 
Communication 
 
7.0 
 
9.3 
 
10.3 
 
10.1 
 
10.9 
 
11.3 
 
Commerce 
 
23.3 
 
23.2 
 
19.9 
 
21.4 
 
19.9 
 
18.2 
 
Other Services 
 
19.3 
 
20.8 
 
21.1 
 
21.9 
 
18.1 
 
17.3 
 
Total 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (1997). 
 
Note: The base year for real value added is 1991. 
 
The changing structure of nominal value added as set out in Table 3 stands in sharp contrast to 
the structure of real value added. In nominal terms, the share of agriculture declined to only 25 
percent by 1996, whereas the commerce sector increased to a similar proportion. Considering 
the movements in the real GDP shares, these trends demonstrate that there have been 
significant differences in the movements of the relative price of value added across sectors. 
Accordingly, the price of labour intensive agricultural value added has decreased relative to 
other sectors. This is most likely due to downward pressures on agricultural producer prices 
following increases in production. Thus, under the circumstances faced by Mozambique, the 
repeated depreciations of the exchange rate have not been able to countervail the general 
downward pressures on agricultural prices. The decline in the relative agricultural value added 
price appears especially steep when compared to the price in the capital intensive commerce 
sector. Rising relative prices can also be observed in the equally capital intensive construction 
and manufacturing (other than food processing). Thus, the share of construction in nominal 
value added has almost doubled to 12.8 percent, while the share of manufacturing has 
stabilised around 1.3 percent. 
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Table 3. Sectoral shares of nominal value added (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
Agriculture 
 
30.7 
 
25.7 
 
28.0 
 
24.2 
 
23.3 
 
25.3 
 
Fisheries 
 
3.5 
 
4.0 
 
3.5 
 
3.0 
 
3.9 
 
3.1 
 
Agricultural Processing 
 
6.5 
 
5.7 
 
4.8 
 
5.6 
 
5.7 
 
5.9 
 
Mining 
 
0.4 
 
0.3 
 
0.4 
 
0.4 
 
0.5 
 
0.4 
 
Manufactures 
 
2.8 
 
2.7 
 
2.1 
 
1.1 
 
1.3 
 
1.3 
 
Construction 
 
6.5 
 
8.3 
 
7.7 
 
11.4 
 
12.5 
 
12.8 
 
Transport and 
Communication 
 
7.0 
 
7.5 
 
8.1 
 
7.5 
 
6.9 
 
6.0 
 
Commerce 
 
23.3 
 
21.9 
 
17.5 
 
22.3 
 
23.9 
 
25.3 
 
Other Services 
 
19.3 
 
23.9 
 
27.9 
 
24.4 
 
22.0 
 
19.9 
 
Total 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (1997). 
 
The evolution over time of the expenditure components of real GDP is depicted in Table 4. 
These figures show that the share of private marketed consumption declined significantly from 
almost 75 percent to less than 60 percent of GDP in the period 1991 to 1996. Moreover, the 
value of marketed consumption underlying the shares in Table 4 includes the value of NGO 
expenditures, which expanded significantly during 1995-96. Excluding NGO expenditures 
from marketed consumption brings the 1996 marketed consumption to GDP ratio down to 56 
percent. The GDP share of real home consumed production has remained stable at around 23 
percent, implying inter alia that the growth rate of real home consumed production has 
matched that of real GDP. In contrast, government consumption has declined as a share of real 
GDP. These developments imply that the overall contribution of consumption towards GDP 
has decreased significantly. 
 
The mirror image of the large drop in the GDP share of real consumption is a significantly 
reduced negative trade balance to GDP ratio. Thus, the export share increased during 1995-96 
to almost 20 percent, while the import share decreased to 36 percent. This reflects a drop in the 
imports of consumer goods, which is consistent with the fact that the GDP share of the 
import-heavy real investment component has increased in more recent years. It is uncertain 
whether the increasing GDP share of real investment can be characterised as robust. 
Nevertheless, preliminary data indicate that the share remained at 25 percent in 1997. 
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Table 4. Expenditure components of real GDP (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
Home Consumption 
 
23 
 
20 
 
23 
 
22 
 
23 
 
23 
 
Marketed 
Consumption 
 
73 
 
70 
 
64 
 
61 
 
62 
 
59 
 
Government 
Consumption 
 
12 
 
12 
 
14 
 
19 
 
10 
 
9 
 
Gross Investment 
 
23 
 
23 
 
22 
 
25 
 
28 
 
25 
 
Exports 
 
12 
 
15 
 
13 
 
14 
 
17 
 
19 
 
Imports 
 
-42 
 
-40 
 
-36 
 
-41 
 
-40 
 
-34 
 
Total 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (1997). 
 
Note: The increase in the GDP share of Government Consumption in 1994 is due to special 
programmes. 
 
The nominal GDP shares in Table 5 are only slightly different from the real GDP shares in 
Table 4, reflecting that changes in relative prices among the different expenditure components 
of GDP were minor. Consistent with price movements in the agriculture and commerce 
sectors, the price of home consumed production has fallen relative to marketed consumption. 
From the real GDP shares it is clear that this shift in relative prices has been accompanied by a 
shift in the consumption pattern away from marketed consumption towards home consumed 
production. It is also clear that the relative price of investment goods has risen significantly. 
This accords well with a similar increase in the relative price of imports. Nonetheless, real 
investment expenditures have increased over time, indicating that the increased relative prices 
on imports have primarily had a negative effect on imports of consumer goods. 
 
The lack of a discernible trend  in the trade balance deficit until 1995, was the cause of much 
concern. An already large trade deficit in 1987 increased to an even higher deficit in 1990 due 
to rapidly growing imports and subdued exports.  Some small headway towards reducing the 
trade deficit was made in the early nineties, but Table 5 demonstrates that imports  remained 
at very high levels until 1995. A significant improvement of the trade balance deficit, due 
mainly to import compression, was, however, recorded in 1996, and preliminary data suggest 
that the trade balance as a share of GDP has fallen to a new low in 1997. Accordingly, the 
trade balance to GDP ratio, which was only slightly above 20 percent in 1996, seems to have 
fallen below 16 percent in 1997. The main driver behind the improvement in 1996, was a 
significant decline in the imports of primary agriculture and agricultural processing, while a 
smaller contribution came from a fall in non-agriculturally related imports. In absolute terms, 
the decrease in agriculturally related imports was twice as big as the decrease in 
non-agriculturally related imports. The significant decrease in imports of agriculturally related 
goods is in particular related to the bumper crop which resulted from the generous weather 
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conditions in 1996. Thus, imports of maize, i.e. food aid, which had already been reduced 
significantly in 1995, all but vanished in 1996. The decrease in non-agriculturally related 
imports can be also traced to decreases in imports of consumption related items, while imports 
of e.g. construction materials and industrial machinery increased. On the export side, the leap 
in share of exports in GDP in 1995 is primarily due to an increase in exports of services.  
 
 
Table 5. Expenditure components of nominal GDP (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
Home Consumption 
 
23 
 
19 
 
22 
 
19 
 
19 
 
19 
 
Marketed 
Consumption 
 
73 
 
73 
 
65 
 
63 
 
65 
 
62 
 
Government 
Consumption 
 
12 
 
14 
 
16 
 
21 
 
10 
 
9 
 
Gross Investment 
 
23 
 
27 
 
27 
 
32 
 
36 
 
30 
 
Exports 
 
12 
 
15 
 
13 
 
13 
 
19 
 
19 
 
Imports 
 
-42 
 
-49 
 
-43 
 
-48 
 
-49 
 
-39 
 
Total 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (1997). 
 
Developments in public finances are summarised in Table 6, from which it appears that the 
total deficit has fallen significantly in real terms during 1995-96. Moreover, the current fiscal 
deficit has been turned into a surplus from 1995. This is in accordance with the fact that 
emphasis has been put on expenditure retrenchment throughout the whole adjustment process. 
Since real government investment has also been reduced in 1995-96, the deficit on the total 
balance has been on the decrease. Nevertheless, falling grants imply that the deficit after grants 
remains high. 
 
Concerning recurrent expenditures, defence spending made up an overwhelming 34 percent of 
the recurrent budget in 1992, increasing even further to a staggering 38 percent in 1994. This 
year was characterised by large externally funded mine removal and disarmament 
programmes, counteracting the ongoing process of down-sizing the military capacity. In 
accordance, defence expenditures as a proportion of recurrent expenditures was at 23-24 
percent in 1995-96. The retrenchment of defence spending, i.e. the peace dividend, has 
therefore proven to be a major precondition for the appearance of a recurrent budget surplus 
and the accompanying reduction in the overall government budget deficit. 
 
A significant drop in the real value of grants meant that the 1996 real investment expenditure 
fell back to its 1992 level. In this context, account must be taken of the fact that the investment 
budget is likely to contain recurrent expenditure items. For example, all aid funded spending, 
including spending on technical assistance, is considered to be investment. As such, this 
extreme accounting convention is likely to have inflated in particular the 1994 investment 
 
 16 
figure. Accordingly, the balance between recurrent spending and investment expenditures 
should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Turning to the revenue side of the government budget, total tax receipts in real terms have 
remained essentially constant throughout 1992-96, indicating that tax receipts have declined to 
a very low 12 percent of GDP in 1996. The poor revenue performance is consistent with 
relatively strong growth in sectors of the economy, which do not comprise part of the tax base. 
Thus, the tax performance is in accordance both with the observation that real growth in 
Mozambique has been relatively strong in the informal agricultural sector and the fact that 
major tax reforms are yet to be implemented.  
 
 
Table 6: Public Finances (bn. Mt. in 1992 Maputo CPI prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
  Tax Receipts 
 
661 
 
768 
 
660 
 
675 
 
669 
 
  Current Expenditures 
 
765 
 
820 
 
855 
 
612 
 
592 
 
Current Balance 
 
-104 
 
-52 
 
-196 
 
62 
 
77 
 
  Investment Expenditures 
 
694 
 
771 
 
916 
 
801 
 
711 
 
Total Balance 
 
-798 
 
-823 
 
-1111 
 
-738 
 
-633 
 
  Grants 
 
690 
 
655 
 
803 
 
584 
 
441 
 
Balance After Grants 
 
-108 
 
-168 
 
-309 
 
-154 
 
-193 
 
Source: Anuário Estatístico. 
 
Inflation and money stock growth rates for the period 1991-96 are set out in Table 7. Greater 
monetary stability emerged in 1996 after a period where monetary development was clearly 
out of control. Due to currency devaluation and the deregulation of prices, inflation surged at 
the onset of the adjustment period in 1987, hitting rates around 200 percent per year. However, 
annual inflation, as measured by the GDP deflator, had already by the end of 1988 been 
reduced to around 50 percent, and Table 7 shows that inflation, as measured by the 
December-on-December change in the Maputo consumer price index (CPI), remained at 
approximately this level until 1996, where inflation dropped considerably. However, the 
numbers in Table 7 do not provide a clear picture of the actual speed with which price-inflation 
was brought down. Thus, almost complete price stability was registered between April 1996 
and April 1997, with an inflation rate of no more than 4.6 percent. 
 
The monetary authorities did not manage to control the money stock immediately after the 
initiation of the ESRP. This was primarily due to the dual role of the Banco de Moçambique 
(BM) as a central bank with the authority to issue money and as a commercial bank with the 
responsibility of supporting state owned enterprises. Despite the separation of commercial and 
central banking functions in 1992, BM continued to make overdraft lending available to the 
two state-owned commercial banks Banco Comercial de Moçambique (BCM) and Banco 
Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD). Since BM had no other option than printing money in 
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order to finance these loans, the money stock soared in the period leading up to 1995. The 
correlation between M1 and CPI was close in this period, but it became even closer during 
1996. Thus, the December-on-December growth rates of M1 and CPI for 1996 was very 
similar in size, and both growth rates were significantly down from the year before. The 
correspondence between M1 and CPI growth rates suggests that inflation was in this period to 
a large extent a monetary problem, although this is a debated issue. In any case, neither general 
wage-pressures, private sector credit expansion or government expenditure growth appear as 
plausible causes for the observed inflation rates (EIU, 1997). 
 
The exchange rate between the Metical and the US$ was devalued in several steps after the 
inception of the ESRP in 1987, and following a very large initial jump it has moved more or 
less in line with the domestic inflation rate. Despite the initial depreciation of around 700 
percent, the overvaluation at that time is likely to have been much greater. This implies that the 
depreciation of the Metical has continuously lagged behind the rate of domestic inflation, and, 
consequently, that Mozambique has experienced an overvalued exchange rate during much of 
the structural adjustment period. This may well have contributed towards the impressive return 
to price stability in 1996 and 1997. Though the Metical is still likely to be overvalued, it has 
stabilised along with prices. Accordingly, during a six month stretch in 1996, the Metical 
depreciated by only 3.6 percent against the US dollar, implying a further real appreciation.
5
 
 
 
Table 7. Growth rates for the money stock and the Maputo CPI (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
M1 
 
35.7 
 
59.3 
 
78.8 
 
57.6 
 
56.2 
 
19.9 
 
CPI 
 
35.2 
 
54.5 
 
43.6 
 
70.1 
 
55.0 
 
16.2 
 
E 
 
54.4 
 
69.6 
 
53.1 
 
58.9 
 
50.2 
 
25.3 
 
Source: Anuário Estatístico and Statistical Bulletin. 
 
Note: Growth rates for M1 and CPI refer to December-on-December changes. 
 
 
The development of the different components of the current account according to official 
figures is presented in Table 8.
6
 It appears that official data also show an improvement in the 
real trade balance. Moreover, the service balance has improved in recent years, due to a 
stabilisation of interest payments combined with increasing service account income. Despite 
these improvements, the current account balance has remained essentially unchanged, due to 
                                                 
5
 It is likely that part of the currency overvaluation problem is related to “Dutch disease” effects 
stemming from the substantial inflows of foreign aid. 
6
 The trade balance data, included in the balance of payments, is the official data compiled by the NDP. 
Accordingly, the current account resembles closely the NDP estimate of the trade balance deficit. The difference 
between the trade balance and current account amounts to the recurrent service balance deficit. 
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the developments of capital transfers. The real value of foreign capital transfers has decreased 
by two-thirds since 1993, and since the major part of these transfers has been of an unrequited 
nature, this drop represents a major decrease in grant aid allocations. A large part of this 
decrease can be related to the completion of aid financed special programmes, as well as the 
inflow of food aid related to the drought of 1992. Since these externally financed projects are 
likely to have been very import-intensive, a large share of the concurrent decrease in imports 
has probably been caused by the disappearance of these projects. Nevertheless, the picture of a 
significant decrease in direct grant aid transfers still remains. Unrequited transfers, which 
decreased from 565 mio. US$ in 1995 to 339 mio. US$ in 1996, fell even further to 283 mio. 
US$ in 1997, according to preliminary data. 
 
 
Table 8. The current account balance (bn. Mt. in 1992 prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
 Exports 
 
337 
 
339 
 
345 
 
383 
 
433 
 
484 
 
 Imports 
 
-1868 
 
-2080 
 
-2498 
 
-2606 
 
-1807 
 
-1717 
 
Trade balance 
 
-1531 
 
-1741 
 
-2154 
 
-2224 
 
-1374 
 
-1233 
 
 Service balance 
 
-228 
 
-323 
 
-332 
 
-411 
 
-316 
 
-191 
 
 Capital transfers 
 
1267 
 
1482 
 
1644 
 
1797 
 
843 
 
606 
 
Current account 
balance 
 
-492 
 
-582 
 
-841 
 
-838 
 
-847 
 
-818 
 
Source: Anuário Estatístico and Statistical Bulletin. 
 
Note: The current account numbers (in US$) have been inflated by the official yearly 
Metical/US$ exchange rate, and deflated by the yearly average of the monthly Maputo 
consumer price index. 
 
The capital account of the balance of payments is presented in Table 9. The capital account 
balance has improved significantly in real terms. Accordingly, the capital account has turned 
from a large deficit in 1993 to a large surplus in 1996. Mozambique has been able to attract 
external loans on an increasing scale since 1993, reaching a level in 1996 which surpassed the 
level of capital transfers. Accordingly, in combination with a 50 percent decrease in 
amortization payments, this makes up the lions share of the big improvement in the capital 
account balance. Amortization payments have been decreasing, stemming from a combination 
of debt-rescheduling and debt reductions. The direct investment component has recently shown 
significant progress, reaching a peak in 1996 when it climbed to more than 20 percent of the 
value of new external loans. 
  
 
 19 
 
 
 
Table 9. The capital account balance (bn. Mt. in 1992 prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
 External Loans 
 
300 
 
413 
 
485 
 
666 
 
702 
 
744 
 
 Amortization 
 
-736 
 
-852 
 
-849 
 
-812 
 
-670 
 
-419 
 
 Direct Investment 
 
47 
 
62 
 
84 
 
90 
 
112 
 
155 
 
Capital Account 
 
-390 
 
-377 
 
-280 
 
-57 
 
143 
 
481 
 
Source: Anuário Estatístico and Statistical Bulletin. 
 
Note: The capital account numbers (in US$) have been inflated by the official yearly 
Metical/US$ exchange rate, and deflated by the yearly average of the monthly Maputo 
consumer price index. 
 
The financing of the balance of payments deficit during 1991-96 is set out in Table 10. It 
follows that the real value of the financing requirement has decreased drastically through 1996 
due to an unchanged current account and the significantly improved capital account. Despite 
the fall in the financing requirement, debt relief has remained at a high level, making it 
possible to increase foreign exchange reserves in each of the years 1994-96. Furthermore, 
changes in arrears have been an important source of finance in several years.  
 
 
Table 10. Financing of the balance of payments deficit (bn. Mt. in 1992 prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
 Change in Reserves 
 
-26 
 
-97 
 
121 
 
-136 
 
-148 
 
-339 
 
 Debt Relief 
 
800 
 
1626 
 
555 
 
595 
 
310 
 
663 
 
 Change in Arrears 
 
178 
 
-540 
 
465 
 
429 
 
475 
 
-131 
 
Financing 
 
952 
 
989 
 
1142 
 
887 
 
637 
 
193 
 
Source: Anuário Estatístico and Statistical Bulletin. 
 
Note: The financing numbers (in US$) have been inflated by the official yearly Metical/US$ 
exchange rate, and deflated by the yearly average of the monthly Maputo consumer price 
index. 
 
Indicators for social sector rehabilitation during the adjustment period, including in particular 
the health care and educational systems, are given in Table 11 below. From the observations 
regarding immunization against DPT and measles, it is clear that extension of health care has 
been improving. The general revitalisation of the health system is also visible from the infant 
mortality rate, which has been declining since the cease-fire in 1992. Nevertheless, absolute 
levels are still among the worst in the world. The reconstruction of the educational system has 
only made slow progress, as witnessed by the gross school enrollment figures. Thus, the 
 
 20 
enrollment rate of the priority sector of primary education has only increased modestly, while 
enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary education have remained essentially unchanged. The 
increasing number of primary school teachers and the concurrent increase in the pupil-teacher 
ratio shows, however, that gross enrollment in primary education has been increasing 
significantly. Thus, the slow progress in the gross enrollment rate can mainly be attributed to a 
significant increase in the number of school age children. 
 
 
Table 11. Social Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
Immunization, DPT 
(% of children under 12 
months) 
 
46 
 
50 
 
49 
 
55 
 
57 
 
NA 
 
Immunization, measles 
(% of children under 12 
months) 
 
55 
 
56 
 
62 
 
65 
 
71 
 
NA 
 
Mortality rate, infant 
(per 1,000 live births) 
 
NA 
 
134 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
126 
 
123 
 
School enrollment, 
primary 
(% gross) 
 
67 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
57 
 
58 
 
60 
 
School enrollment, 
secondary 
(% gross) 
 
8 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
School enrollment, 
tertiary 
(% gross) 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
0.4 
 
0.4 
 
0.5 
 
Primary education, 
teachers 
 
 
22236 
 
22474 
 
22396 
 
NA 
 
24575 
 
NA 
 
Pupil-teacher ratio, 
primary 
 
 
54.7 
 
53.4 
 
54.8 
 
NA 
 
57.6 
 
NA 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (1997) 
 
Note: NA indicates that data are not available. 
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5. Economic stabilization and structural adjustment in perspective 
 
Major macroeconomic reform issues, singled out by the Bretton Woods institutions at the 
beginning of the adjustment process, included as already noted in Section 3 that Mozambique 
consumed beyond its means, production was focussed excessively on non-tradeables, and 
monetary and credit control was lacking. In addition, the economy was characterised as 
inefficient and inflexible due to government failures in terms of interventionist measures and 
outdated legislation. It is clear that action has been taken in each of these problem areas. Thus, 
most of the available policy measures, which were perceived as preconditions for achieving 
economic stability and growth, have been deployed. This section will put the actual 
achievements into perspective, based on the policy measures implemented as well as other 
developments outside of government control. 
 
Turning first to the performance of GDP, respectable rates of growth have occurred in 
Mozambique in recent years as shown in Section 4. It is moreover clear that established targets 
of 4-5 percent growth on an annual basis (Arneberg, 1996 and World Bank, Policy Framework 
Paper, 1997) have in general been surpassed. Nevertheless, the positive economic 
performance, which has marked a turnaround, need to be assessed in the light of factors, which 
have favoured a quick recovery. The 1992-97 period saw the return of millions of displaced 
people to productive activity in parallel with the reestablishment of political stability. In 
addition, weather conditions have been excellent, and aid inflows have remained high. 
Considering as well the very low initial level of GDP, following the collapse in 1986, the 
virtual stand still of the economy in 1987-91 and the drought in 1992, the growth actually 
recorded appears less impressive. 
 
Real investment expenditures, which grew quickly between 1992 and 1996, seem to have 
stabilised at a reasonable 25 percent of GDP. In the past, concern was expressed over the 
effectiveness of the investment expenditures, since growth rates in real GDP per capita 
remained at or below 5 percent. One explanation offered for this apparently low impact of 
investment was that investment figures were too high due to the common practise of including 
foreign funded items of a recurrent nature in the investment budget. This practice has 
previously given an upward bias to official investment figures.
7
 Nonetheless, the NIS 
investment numbers, which represent combined public and private investment, have nothing to 
do with the amount declared as investment spending in the government budget. Thus, NIS 
allocates expenditure between consumption and investment based upon expenditure categories. 
As such, the NIS investment figures are representative of actual investment levels. This 
implies that statistical considerations are not likely to form part of the explanation why growth 
rates in real GDP per capita stayed below 5 percent prior to 1996. Accordingly, it seems that 
the productivity of investment undertaken in the past has been lower than what could 
reasonably be expected. With reference to the apparently good 1997 GDP performance, it may 
nevertheless be that a turning point has been reached. 
                                                 
7
 Official government investment figures amounted, in 1995, to about 45% of total investment  as 
estimated by NIS. 
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Investment expenditures have during the adjustment period relied heavily on aid grants for 
financing, due in particular to the poor performance of government revenue. Recent 
advancements in attracting foreign direct investment and foreign loans indicate that 
Mozambique has initiated tentative steps towards lowering the dependence on foreign aid 
transfers. Moreover, a number of externally financed so-called mega projects has been 
outlined, including in particular an aluminium smelter and a reduced iron plant, both to be 
placed in Maputo. Nevertheless, aid transfers will in general have to play a big role as a source 
of investment finance in at least the short- to medium-term future. Donor dependence is not 
likely to go away rapidly. This is underpinned by the critical fact that relative investment 
goods prices have risen over the adjustment period. 
 
As regards consumption, an overly high private consumption share of GDP, amounting to 96 
percent in 1991, had been reduced to slightly more than 80 percent in 1996. Since the 
government consumption share of GDP also fell over this period, reasonable progress was 
made in reducing the initial consumption to GDP imbalance. This trend  is confirmed by 
preliminary data for 1997. One of the major features of the seemingly stable and continuous 
economic growth of recent years, is that growth in the informal agricultural sector has been 
high. Thus, the private household budget share of consumed marketed goods is decreasing 
rapidly while the budget share of home consumed production is increasing. This development 
must be viewed as a good thing, in the sense that increasing home consumed production 
promotes food security at the family level. It also allows peasants to allocate scarce financial 
resources for other more productive use. Yet, this development can also be seen as an 
indication that the investment efforts, which have gone into improving informational networks 
and the marketing opportunities for rural people, have not as yet been sufficient to ensure 
broad based market-oriented economic development. It must also be kept in mind that 
consumption still remains at very low levels in absolute terms. In other words, poverty remains 
widespread. 
 
A most pertinent issue among macro-economic stabilisation problems yet to be addressed 
effectively is fiscal adjustment. Despite recent improvement in the government budget 
balances, the development of the government revenue side is unsatisfactory. Thus, poor 
performance in most of the government revenue items, has meant that overall government 
revenue has consistently failed to keep pace with GDP. The privatisation of the much criticized 
customs administration is likely to increase not only the efficiency and attractiveness of the 
Maputo port as a provider of transit services to South Africa but also import tariff revenues due 
to a better custom declarations control. Nevertheless, widespread tax exemptions, which have 
in the past detracted substantially from the revenue generating capability of the important 
goods related taxes, is a thorny issue. Accordingly, the envisioned introduction of a VAT in the 
near future is expected to retain a significant number of tax exemptions. Finally, since it is 
difficult to tax the growing informal sector activities, government is clearly faced with a need 
to pursue further fiscal reforms, including in particular the design of more efficient 
mechanisms for generating revenue in a market oriented economy. 
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Due to the poor performance of the government revenue side, all of the budget adjustments 
have so far taken place on the expenditure side of the budget. A large part of the adjustment 
was achieved through the so-called peace dividend. However, instead of cutting back on the 
work force, the government compressed wages and salaries of civil servants as part of the 
process of returning to a recurrent budget surplus. Accordingly, the government of 
Mozambique is now faced with the double-edged challenge of wage decompression and the 
need to reduce the number of employees. Furthermore, much attention must continue to be 
directed towards the modernisation of budgetary and financial administrative procedures. In 
this context, corruption has been on the increase both as a consequence of inappropriate 
legislation, still to be modified, and due to the failure of the legal system to address this issue 
in the transition from a command-type to a market economy. In sum, while fiscal adjustment 
has taken place, this remains a fragile area of the reform efforts. 
 
Throughout the adjustment period, the balance of payments has been strongly affected by 
developments in debt-rescheduling, debt reductions and aid grants. Foreign debt originally 
started  accumulating in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the build-up intensified during 
the war period. In the early 1990s all debt indicators had reached massive and clearly 
unsustainable levels, and in spite of debt relief, new loan financing of the continuing current 
account deficits meant that the debt stock stood at 5.78 bn. US$, or 16 times export earnings, 
in 1995. The debt-service obligations related to this huge foreign currency debt, has 
continuously put strains on the balance of payments, and it will continue to do so until the debt 
burden has been substantially reduced. Some cautious optimism for the future can be expressed 
here, as negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions towards reaching an agreement 
within the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative is envisioned to reduce 
outstanding debt by some 85 percent by mid-1999. This would reduce the debt burden to a 
more sustainable 200 percent of yearly export earnings. 
 
The debt reduction initiative is all the more important given that foreign capital transfers in 
general and aid grants in particular have been decreasing in recent years. The sharp negative 
trend, which can be observed in the numbers from 1994-96, is largely explained by the 
external funding of special programmes in 1994. Nonetheless, there appears to be an additional 
downward movement in aid grants awarded to Mozambique. The combination of decreasing 
grants and increasing investment expenditures has been realised due to increasing loan inflows 
and reductions in amortization payments. Given that the actual debt-service has fluctuated 
between 17 and 27 percent of amounts due in recent years, the expected HIPC initiative should 
be able to help facilitate a continued capital account surplus, ensuring the positive real resource 
inflow needed for investment purposes. Nevertheless, to avoid a recurrence of the debt 
problem, continued aid inflows at a high level and on grant and concessionary terms are 
indispensable to help close the financing gap from the current account. In this sense, 
Mozambique continues to be one of the most aid dependent countries in the world. 
 
Great concern has in the past been attached to the large deficit on the foreign trade account, 
where imports and exports have hovered around respectively 50 and 15 percent of GDP. More 
recently, exports have been picking up, and since the import-to-GDP ratio declined in 1996-97, 
the trade balance deficit to GDP ratio was brought down substantially. Optimism has been 
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spurred by the fact that the import compression has been achieved without impairing GDP 
growth or investment spending. Accordingly, the drop in the trade balance deficit has not 
affected investment expenditures, but has mainly been achieved through a decrease in imports 
of consumer goods, particularly agriculture. Given the scarcity of foreign exchange and the 
importance of imports for investment purposes, the decreasing imports of consumer goods is a 
positive development. 
 
Putting the interrelated consumption and trade balance patterns into perspective, the progress 
realised is notable, but caution is required when looking to the future. While some 
transformation of production has taken place on the import side, further possibilities for 
relatively easy import substitution and recovery may be limited. This is so since investment 
goods and essential intermediate inputs such as fuel, are not produced locally. Moreover, 
progress on the export side cannot be attributed to a structural shift in the transformation of 
production. Accordingly, major breakthroughs are yet to be made on the export side, if the 
current trend of reducing the dependency on net capital transfers including aid from abroad is 
to continue. Furthermore, the decreasing consumption share of GDP has not so far been 
associated with the necessary shift in consumption pattern, towards a better balance between 
private and public consumption. There is, for example, a need to increase expenditures in 
particular in regard to the educational sector, where pressure is mounting due to a quickly 
expanding population. 
 
The excessive monetary growth and high inflation rate were two of the problem areas 
identified by the ESRP programme. Though lack of monetary control was identified as a 
problem from the outset, progress towards stabilizing monetary growth was only made rather 
late in 1996-97 when reconstruction and privatisation of the commercial parts of the formerly 
state-owned financial institutions was carried out. The fact that monetary growth has 
essentially made up for nominal GDP growth, has meant that the velocity of circulation of M1 
has remained fairly constant at slightly less than 4.0 since 1992. The very high monetary 
growth rates have over the years generated substantial seignorage revenue, amounting to 
around 10% of GDP per year. This income has, however, mainly been directed to the state 
enterprise sector via the previously mentioned soft loans. The new low-inflationary 
environment is likely to be associated with a gradual lowering of inflationary expectations. 
Accordingly, the velocity of circulation should start falling in the near future, allowing the 
government to capture some seignorage revenue without risking a renewed spurt in inflation. 
Similarly, the real rate of interest, which has only recently turned positive, should gradually 
start to come down from the very high current levels. 
 
The developments of the sectoral income shares of GDP at factor cost, show that the relative 
price of value added across sectors  has changed significantly. The relative price of value added 
in capital intensive sectors like the commerce and construction sectors has risen, while prices in 
agriculture have declined. This is a clear indication that capital has remained a scarce and 
constraining factor during the 1992-96 period. 
 
Following the drought of 1992, major emergency packages of food aid were flowing into 
Mozambique from abroad. Good weather conditions in more recent years have meant that 
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domestic production has increasingly been able to substitute for this emergency assistance. Thus, 
the large decreases in food imports of maize were associated with concurrent increases in the real 
value of production of 30-40 percent, in each of the years 1995-96. Following another bumper 
crop in 1997, Mozambique has achieved self-sufficiency in maize, and some progress has even 
been made towards exporting surplus production. However, the potential for relatively easy 
import substitution as part of the recovery process has now been used up, and further expansion 
of production will depend on more fundamental changes in the development constraints faced by 
agricultural producers. 
 
In this regard, significant efforts and resources have been put into improving primary and 
secondary roads as well as rehabilitating the rail networks. These efforts have been first steps in 
promoting Mozambique as an efficient provider of transport services to neighbouring countries, 
and as such they have provided Mozambique with possibilities for generating additional foreign 
exchange earnings. Transit services have since 1991 been the major export article of 
Mozambique, even surpassing the critically important fisheries sector. Nevertheless, extension of 
infrastructure  to underdeveloped rural areas remains inadequate. Mozambique has a large 
untapped potential for agricultural development, not only as a supplier of the domestic market, 
but also as a provider of exports. This potential cannot, and will not, be utilized effectively until 
major extensions of the economic infrastructure are made. 
 
While improvements in infrastructure are likely to boost the livelihood of some peasants, this is 
by itself insufficient to reduce poverty on a major scale. The current production technology, used 
in small-scale agricultural production, continues to be of a very rudimentary nature. Since little 
has been achieved over the adjustment period in this area, technological improvements are going 
to be critical, in any future agricultural development strategy. Nevertheless, the financial needs 
associated with improved production methods means that technological extension on any larger 
scale will have to go hand in hand with an extension of the branch network of the financial 
system to the rural areas. This is, however, only likely to materialise in the longer perspective, 
and then only in connection with increased marketing opportunities, and enhanced legal 
enforcement of contract laws. 
 
Small-scale agricultural development is also going to depend on a proper solution to the 
emerging problem of land entitlements. This has only recently started to attract attention. 
Mozambique is blessed with an abundance of cultivable land, and only in the southern provinces 
of Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane, does the area required by traditional extensive techniques 
exceed the quantity of available land. Some parcels of land are, however, more valuable than 
others due to natural fertility, and access to irrigation water and markets. Moreover, the current 
land law, which does in principle protect the rights of smallholders, is difficult to enforce by the 
government due to a lack of skill and money. Consequently, dispossession of smallholders is a 
looming problem, which is likely to become steadily more prominent as the possibilities for 
resettlement on favourable land become more limited. 
 
Developments in processed food production also bear evidence to the poor state of the road 
network. Overall grain milling production has remained at roughly the same level during 
1993-96, and since the real value of grain milling imports still makes up almost 75 percent of 
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domestic production, there seems to be some further potential for domestic expansion and import 
substitution in this sector. However, grain milling imports consist mainly of processed rice and 
wheat flour while domestic production is mainly maize flour. Following the 1993 price 
liberalisation for maize flour, output increased in 1994 only, so domestic production is still 
hovering around the 1991 level. Moreover, the large effective protection afforded to domestic 
wheat flour milling and the 1996 domestic price liberalisation have not as yet resulted in any 
import substitution. Accordingly, the potential for import substitution in processed food 
production remains untapped.  
 
Summing-up, one of the primary aims of the reform measures introduced in the adjustment 
process, was to shift the composition of domestic output towards tradeable goods. In fact, while 
the export share of GDP has gone up by about 50 percent, this is mainly due to a leap in export 
of services. Earlier food aid is no longer imported. Accordingly, a major part of the import 
substitution has occurred as part of the return to more normal conditions, following the severe 
drought and the cessation of hostilities in 1992. Due to the fact that the major import substitution 
possibilities associated with the recovery of the agricultural sector have already been exploited, it 
follows that there is a need for a future development strategy to include a focus on how the 
tradeability of Mozambican goods can be increased. 
 
The micro-economic efficiency enhancing instruments, employed as part of the ESRP 
programme, includes the privatisation of state enterprises and the liberalisation of prices. During 
the period with socialist rule, all banks and the vast majority of companies had been nationalized, 
and the efficiency of production declined. Thus, there was a large potential for efficiency gains at 
the outset of the privatisation programme. Coming off from a slow start, the privatisation of the 
important larger state companies has accelerated more recently. However, an authoritative 
assessment of this process seems premature, as the final verdict on the privatisation of the larger 
firms is still out. Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude that the privatisation of the commercial parts 
of the formerly state-owned banks, together with the entrance of new banks, has helped to 
increase competition in the financial sector. In addition, the stated goals regarding domestic price 
liberalisation has essentially been met. Accordingly, domestic price liberalisation is no longer 
regarded as a major policy issue. 
 
Rehabilitation of the social sector continues to present major challenges for the government. 
Revitalisation of the health care system is reflected in a decreasing child mortality rate, but a lot 
remains to be done. Improvements to the devastated educational system have also taken place. 
Hence, almost all of the school network, which was closed down due to the civil war, has been 
reconstructed, and the number of primary school teachers has increased. These improvements 
have not, however, been able to meet the increasing requirements of a country, characterized by 
a significant return of refugees and other displaced people as well as a rapidly growing 
population. Thus, significant budgetary reallocation towards social sectors is necessary in the 
future, if major improvements are to be achieved. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
More than a decade after the start of the stabilisation and structural adjustment programme in 
Mozambique, and after five years of peace, macroeconomic stabilisation has as shown in this 
paper been arrived at in Mozambique. Recent indicators show that monetary control is effective 
and inflation is low. Furthermore, stable growth has set in over the past few years, and there is 
little left in terms of policy induced distortions. As such, key recommendations of the liberal 
reform programme have been achieved. While some see the results as fully satisfactory it is also 
clear that much of the progress realised to date can be attributed to economic recovery from an 
extraordinarily suppressed situation. In any case, it is evident that the long climb towards greater 
prosperity has only just begun. Many basic requirements for economic growth, such as physical 
infrastructure, functioning government administration, and human capital are still suffering from 
prolonged neglect and underdevelopment. In addition, structural imbalances continue to be 
endemic, including severe aid dependency. 
 
Progress since 1992 includes that the excessive consumption share of GDP has been reduced. In 
addition, the foreign trade position has improved. Yet, the composition of private consumption 
remains highly focussed on home consumption of own production. Moreover, while the question 
of how large the government should be is a subtle one, it is clear that there is a critical need for 
fiscal and administrative changes. The turn around in the trade balance has in particular been 
achieved through a decrease in the imports of consumer goods. The actual import substitution, 
which has occurred so far, has however in large measure been related to the recovery of the 
agricultural sector, following the 1992 drought and the cessation of hostilities. Some possibilities 
for import substitution remain, e.g. in grain milling activities. Nevertheless, the continuing need 
for imports of investment and essential consumer goods to underpin development put a strict 
limit on the effectiveness of further import compression. This puts focus on the need to improve 
the tradeability of Mozambican products and their competitiveness in domestic and international 
markets. 
 
It is widely recognised that the agricultural sector will have to play a key role in any poverty 
reducing development process in Mozambique. Yet, this sector is in spite of some progress far 
from attaining its full potential. Prices may have been liberalised, but major infrastructure 
impediments continue to hamper market integration of the typical small-scale farmer. To this can 
be added that production technologies are extremely crude, requiring both technological and 
extension breakthroughs on a massive scale. A wide range of institutional preconditions, 
including a financial and judiciary system with the ability to enforce contracts and land 
entitlements, is also far from being in place. Accordingly, a coherent development strategy 
directed towards poverty reduction remains to be implemented. 
 
In sum, the successful stabilisation of inflation and monetary growth as well as the high and 
stable investment level reported in this paper give rise to optimism for the future of 
Mozambique. Many distorting policy induced interventions have also been removed. 
Nevertheless, plain recovery has played a vital role in the turn around over the past few years. 
The underlying real development constraints remain much the same, and while market forces 
have been set free, the government is caught with little capacity and ability to act. The alleviation 
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of widespread poverty will remain an elusive goal unless institutional requirements, such as an 
effective regulatory framework, and the promotion of agricultural production and food security, 
beyond mere market liberalisation, are put at the top of the list of priorities for the future. In fact, 
the more difficult development challenges lie ahead. 
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